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TAX EXEMPTION: REAL PROPERTY USED FOR
PUBLIC PURPOSE
Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n,
167 Ohio St. 273, 147 N.E.2d 857 (1958);
Cleveland v. Board Tax App.,
167 Ohio St. 263, 147 N.E.2d 663 (1958).
The Board of Tax Appeals granted a request of the Ohio Turn-
pike Commission to have real property within the turnpike project-
including service plazas-placed on the exempt tax lists for 1956, on
the premise that the land title rested in the state, and that the property
was devoted exclusively to a public purpose and exempt under Revised
Code section 5537.20. The Cuyahoga county auditor objected to the
inclusion of service plazas on the exempt tax lists and appealed to the
Ohio Supreme Court. The court upheld the exemptions' as within
article XII, section 2, of the Ohio Constitution, and within the appli-
cable Ohio statutes.2
The majority found it necessary to interpret article XII, section 2,
of the Ohio Constitution to determine the scope of power in the general
assembly to exempt publicly owned property from taxation. The rele-
vent portion of that section states:
... without limiting the general power . . . to determine the
subjects and methods of taxation or exemptions therefrom,
general laws may be passed to exempt burying grounds, public
school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship, in-
stitutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public
property used exclusively for any public purpose. (Emphasis
added.)
The majority of the Ohio Supreme Court and the legislature are
in direct conflict as to the meaning of this section, the court ruling that
the legislature is limited to those enumerated exemptions, the legislature
indicating it is not.3
The dispute can 'best be settled by looking at the historical context
in which this constitutional amendment was adopted in 1929. For
seventy-five years preceding 1929, article XII, section 2, directly limited
exemptions of real and personal property. All property was to be taxed
according to its true value, excepting only the enumerated classes. If
I Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 167- Ohio St. 273, 147 N.E.2d 857 (1958).
2 OHIO REV. CODE §§5709.08 (1953), 5537.20 (1953), 5537.23 (1953).
3 Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 268,
55 N.E.2d 122 (1944); Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143
Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E.2d 896 (1944); Culitan v. Cunningham Sanitarium, 134
Ohio St. 99, 16 N.E.2d 205 (1938) ; Cincinnati v. Lewis, 66 Ohio St. 49, 63 N.E.
588 (1902). See Caren, Constitutional Limitations on the Exemption of Real
Property from Taxation, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 207 (1950).
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one purpose of the 1929 amendment was "to provide for a more flexible
system of taxation,,' 4 removal of limitations on the legislature's exemp-
tion power would tend to implement that policy;' restricting the exemp-
tion power to that existing prior to the amendment disregards that policy.
In 1929 the electorate approved present article XII, section 2, which
limited the amount of tax that could be levied on any property, and left
everything else to the discretion of the general assembly.' In Struble v.
Davis,7 the court in the opinion accepted that interpretation.
As amended the constitution itself now provides that the
enumeration of certain classes of property which may be ex-
empted does not take away or limit authority of the legislature
to make other exemptions.
By 1944 the court restricted this interpretation of the constitutional
amendment, and in Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
EvattO the court distinguished the Struble case as involving only personal
property. Exemptions of real property, the court insisted, had always
been limited to those enumerated exemptions and were not changed by
the 1929 amendment. The court summed up its conclusions as to the
exemption power in paragraph two of the syllabus of Zangerle v.
Cleveland.9
The power of the General Assembly to exempt real property
from taxation is limited to the kinds and classes enumerated
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having raised the constitutional question, the court in the Carney
case examined the relevent statutes affecting the case. Revised Code
section 5709.08, exempting from taxation real and personal property
owned by the state when used exclusively for a public purpose, was
passed pursuant to the constitutional grant of authority. This statute
itself is capable of great expansion or contraction depending on the
court's view of what is "exclusively for a public purpose."."°
Two statutes specifically relating to turnpike projects were also in-
4This purpose was stated in the proposal submitted to the electorate by
the 88th General Assembly. See Caren, supra note 3, at 209.
5 Cleveland v. Board Tax App., 153 Ohio St. 97, 119, 91 N.E.2d 480
(1950) (dissent).
6 Cleveland v. Board Tax App., supra note 5, at 116, 91 N.E. 2d at 489
(dissent); Board Education v. Board Tax App., 149 Ohio St. 564, 80 N.E.2d 156
(1948); State ex rel Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9. N.E.2d 684 (1937).
51 Am. JUR., Public Bodies and Property 557 (1944). Caren, supra note 3, at 209.
7 Supra note 6, at 560, 9 N.E.2d at 686.
8 Supra note 3.
9 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945).
10 Cleveland municipal stadium held not exclusively for a public use, Cleve-
land v. Board Tax App. (1950), supra note 5; Municipal transportation
system held not exclusively for a public use, Zangerle v. Cleveland, supra note 9;
overruled, Cleveland v. Board Tax App., 167 Ohio St. 263, 147 N.E.2d 663
(1958) ; land of municipal airport leased to private corporation held exclusive
public use, Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944).
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volved. Revised Code section 5709.20 specifically exempts from taxa-
tion any turnpike project or any property acquired or used by the Ohio
Turnpike Commission. To insure clarity of legislative intent Revised
Code section 5537.23 was inserted, stating that the turnpike provisions,
being necessary to the state's welfare, should be liberally construed. In
line with past decisions the majority channels the factual questions into
the constitutional and statutory exemptions of "public property used ex-
clusively for any public purpose," despite the above statutory provisions
expressly dealing with the turnpike.
Once the court determined that service plazas are "concomitants
of turnpike operation" the conclusion exempting them with all other
turnpike property naturally follows. The "exclusive" public character
of the highway itself carries over into the plazas, even though privately
owned and proprietory in nature. The majority supports its holding with
Toledo v. Jenkins"l where real estate incidental to the operation of a
municipal airport was held devoted to a public use, even though rented
to a private corporation for profit.
The concurring opinion of Judge Taft clearly points up the illogi-
calities of the majority ruling. Judge Taft recognizes that the profitable
service plazas, though situated on state owned land, are not really "ex-
clusively for a public purpose," viewing that phrase in the light of its
prior judicial history. 2 The real users of the land are the private corpo-
rations with businesses situated thereon. He also expressed the conviction
that article XII, section 2, gives the legislature general powers to deter-
mine exemptions, limited only by article I (Bill of Rights). If this
historically correct interpretation is accepted the legislature can directly
prescribe any reasonable exemption, whether" of a governmental or a
proprietory nature. Thus the paradox of fitting varied special exemption
into the "exclusively for a public purpose" category would be un-
necessary.
The expansion of the "public purpose" doctrine as portrayed in the
Carney case continued into the municipal property area in Cleveland v.
Board Tax Appeals (1958), a where exemption of Cleveland's
municipal transportation system was approved, expressly overruling
Zangerle v. Cleveland.14 The Cleveland case can be viewed as the burial
of the stagnant concept that state owned property of a proprietory nature
could not be exempted from taxation. The court is now willing to hold
that some municipally owned property of a proprietory nature is "public
property used exclusively for any public purpose" under Revised Code
section 5709.08. How far the court will carry this ruling beyond public
11 Supra note 10.
12 Cleveland v. Board Tax App. (1958), supra note 10; Columbus v. County
of Delaware, 164 Ohio St. 605, 132 N.E.2d 747 (1956).
13 Supra note 10
14 Supra note 9.
1958]
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utility functions remains to be seen.' 5
Certainly the combined effect of the Carney and Cleveland cases
creates doubt as to the status of marginal cases like Cleveland v. Board
Tax Appeals (1950)," where a municipal stadium and adjacent
parking lots were held outside the exemption area because rented out
during a substantial part of the year. Judge Taft believes the majority
conclusion in the Carney case overrules Cleveland v. Board Tax
Appeals (1950), and the language of the latter Cleveland (1958) case,
recognizing proprietory uses as no bar to exemption, seems to strengthen
this conclusion. The profits, if any, received by a city from rental of
its stadium and from concessionaires is not so different from profits re-
ceived from rental of turnpike property for service plazas, or from
profits received from a municipal transportation system. The latter is
the clearest case of public use, the rental of turnpike property to private
corporations the least clear. Logically a municipal stadium should fall
between the two and also be exempt from taxation within the exclusive
public use doctrine.
Nicholas L. Demos
15 See Stimson, The Exemption of Publicly Owned Property From Taxation,
8 U. CIN. L. REV. 32 (1934) for complete discussion on exemption of municipal
industries.
16 Supra note 5.
[Vol, 19
